

11K
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS REPORT NO. VIII
Granada Relocation Center

Factors and Attitudes in the Resettlement Problem

I. The Nature of the Report

This analysis of factors and attitudes in the resettlement problem as it is faced by the evacuee residents of the Granada Relocation Center is a statement of certain objective and psychological conditions as they were found to exist during the summer period, June 30 - August 31, 1944. The study is not exhaustive and does not constitute a complete analysis of all factors. It does purport, however, to point up the salient features of the situation.

The materials upon which this report is based are of three sorts:

- (a) Quantitative data based on population statistics and leave issues.
- (b) Attitudes and opinions as expressed by the evacuees themselves.
- (c) Observations recorded by the community analyst in interaction with the evacuee residents and appointed personnel.

The quantitative aspects of this study were deliberately limited for two reasons:

- (a) This study is complementary to the more detailed statistical Relocation Outlook investigation emanating from the Relocation Office and the erstwhile Family Counselling Unit. It, therefore, anticipates on a generalized basis what the more comprehensive Relocation Outlook investigation may be expected to particularize in detail. It was also used as an instrument to prepare the public for the reception of the individualized study on Relocation Outlook. This study is more in the nature of a subjective, spot probing for immediate results.
- (b) The community analyst had to work within a definite time limitation.

II. The Method of Investigation

The statistical data were obtained from the census roster and files of admissions and departures, maintained by the Statistics Section, and the leave records of the Relocation Office.

The attitudinal materials were derived in two ways:

- (a) Individual and confidential interviews,
- (b) A program of group discussions.

The program of group discussions was preceded by a very careful preparation in cooperation with the Community Council and the Block Manager's Assembly.

As a first step, on July 12, chairman and vice-chairman of the Community Council were invited to discuss the value of the assessment of the resettlement problem from the point of view of the evacuees still resident in the Center. They readily grasped the significance of the problem, and from there the discussions moved to consideration of ways and means. It was agreed that evacuee participation in the preparation of the study was necessary as a means of stimulating interest and free expression of their opinions and felt needs. The two Council officers agreed that this could be a proper undertaking for the Council as the peoples' representative body. They also suggested the idea of a series of group discussions organized either by blocks or districts. They further suggested the advisability of a full discussion of the matter with the entire Council body. On this basis an invitation was extended to the community analyst and the head of the Family Counselling Unit (who was carrying the responsibility of Relocation Outlook investigation) to request the Council for a special meeting at which a presentation of the two proposed investigations would be discussed. This request was granted on July 18, and a special meeting of the Council was called for July 22. The Council then unanimously endorsed the two projects, and appointed a special committee of three to assist in its formulation and completion.

This committee, on instruction from the Council, presented the proposed program to the Block Manager's Assembly, July 24. The Block Managers unanimously agreed to cooperate and appointed three members to assist jointly with the special Council committee.

The joint committee, meeting with the analyst, concluded that a program of district meetings, at which evacuees could discuss resettlement problems with the analyst, offered the best possibilities of producing good results. It was further decided that each block should hold block meetings in advance of the district meetings, in order to stimulate thinking and interest for the district meetings. A schedule of district meetings was worked out by the committee, and a prospectus for use of the Councilmen and Block Managers was prepared in English and Japanese (See, Appendix I and II). These were also posted in all dining halls.

The district meetings were carried out as scheduled. Attendance at each meeting ranged from 65 to 110. Participants were, with few exceptions, Issei males. Interest in all meetings was keen and intense. Most of the talking by the evacuees was done in Japanese and verbally translated by a volunteer interpreter, who assisted the analyst in all the meetings. A stenographic transcription for each meeting of the evacuee expressions was taken in Japanese. This was later translated into English and is attached to this report (Appendix A). The analyst is deeply indebted to Mr. Shizuo

Yoshida, who freely volunteered his time and energy for the purpose.

III. The Nature of the Residual Population in the Center, Summer 1944

On June 30, 1944, 2495 indefinite leaves had been taken from this Center. The total population, including transferees from Tule Lake and Jerome, was 6097, plus 839 out on short term and seasonal leaves.

The 2495 persons who took indefinite leaves have not been subjected to statistical analysis as to age, sex, religion, etc., but it is a known fact that they are predominantly Nisei, male, under forty-five, English-speaking, Christian and, mostly, urban in origin. For them, it may be said that WRA relocation policies as practiced up to this point have been sufficiently adequate to enable their successful resettlement.

Our problem is the residual group that remains in the Center.

What are its characteristics?

1. Age, Sex and Citizenship

The population of the Center is now an abnormal aggregation of old men, middle-aged women, and children. A profile of the population (Fig. 1) does not show a normal, symmetrical, pine tree-shape, broad at the base and gradually tapered to the oldest age-group at the top. Instead, it has the appearance of a crazy, block-pile built by a child.

It shows a shortage of females in the 30-39 age group and an extensive shortage of men in the 20-55 age group. These deficiencies are due in large measure to the prevalence of individual, non-family resettlement by the youthful and middle-aged persons. They also result in some degree, however, from the fact of the checking of immigration in the 1920's and the consequent over-loading of the upper age brackets in the present period.

For resettlement and the future management of this community, the important fact is that there are relatively few family heads (malos) in the vigorous age of initiative and responsibility left.

Of the 2909 males in the population only 665 are between 20-54 years old. Of these only 373 are citizens.

On the other hand, we have 903 males who are over 55 years of age. They constitute 31% of the total male population.

At the other extreme of the age scale, we have 2575 dependent boys and girls 19 years old and under. This group, with some exceptions, will be moved only by family resettlement.

When the population is broken down into its citizen and alien components, its atypical character is accentuated.

The alien profile (Figure 2) does not form the usual pyramid. Instead, it has the shape of a lopsided top.

There are a few aliens under 40 years of age (136); none are under 10 years. The alien women fall predominantly in the 40-54 age group, while the men are mostly (69.5%) in the 55 to 74 categories.

Conclusion: Physically, the residual population consists mainly of over-aged Issei and dependent, under-aged Nisei. This condition is vitally significant in any future treatment of the problem of resettlement of these people.

IV. Attitudes and Needs that Hinder Resettlement

Undoubtedly, the greatest subjective block to resettlement at the present time is the feeling that the West Coast must be opened for the return of the evacuees. This is the sine qua non of probably the vast majority of Issei.

However, WRA must be prepared for the likelihood that opening the Coast will not result in the immediate resettlement the bulk of the present population or the movement of all the Center population to the Coast.

There are social, economic and psychological reasons for this.

- A. The emotional or psychological blocks to relocation are, still strong, but they have lessened appreciably during the summer months. These blocks are rooted in many causes, chief among which are:
 1. The traumatic shock caused by evacuation and assembly center experience producing:
 - a. Inability to organize oneself to take the necessary steps, even when the wish to do so is present. There are a considerable number of persons in the group of educated group of older persons, who express the desire to relocate but who are still paralyzed and who need skillful counselling and encouragement to take their destinies in their hands again.
 - b. Fear psychosis. There is no doubt that obsessive fear of a hostile outside world holds many in the Center. The bogies that haunt the people here are immensely potent. The constant request that the government guarantee their physical security, and set up protections against mob violence is just one external manifestation of this.

- c. Escapism in lethargy. An inability or unwillingness to face reality by even so much as considering the question of resettlement.
2. Negative resistance to WRA as an agency of the government.
 - a. Resentment resting on the fact of evacuation, property losses, discomfort in assembly centers, selective discrimination (as against German and Italian enemy aliens), organization and administration of the Center takes the form of resistance to WRA proposals.
 - b. The WRA relocation program as it exists to the present is looked upon not as a service to the evacuees, but rather as a means of forcing the evacuees out of the Center "in order to save the government money."
 3. The marginal position of the Issei in American life.
 - a. It is an essential fact that the Issei have been denied American citizenship and are citizens of Japan. Many are Americanized in spirit (especially so among the Los Angeles people) and all are Americanized to some degree in behavior. But it is not to be expected that all sentimental ties to Japan have disappeared. Their rejection by our government and people has thrown them back on their sentimental ties to their country of origin and has resulted in extensive dream phantasies of the beauties and virtues of their home of long ago. Without being overtly disloyal, they cannot help feeling that their destinies are tied to the fate of Japan.
 - (1) Consequently, some Issei have taken the position that they cannot go out to play a productive role in the war effort. They maintain that this would get them listed as traitors in Japan. They are not yet thoroughly convinced that they will not be deported to Japan after the war, so they do not wish to take the chance and prefer "to remain in the Center and be neutral."
 - (2) Others have been waiting in expectation of a Japanese victory, which would result in the imposition of favorable indemnities on their behalf by the Japanese government.

- (3) It has been widely rumored that Tokyo instructions were for the Issei to remain in the Centers. That indemnities would be paid those who do so, but not to those who relocate.

The effective war record of the Mixed combat units and favorable public reaction, the center-wide Memorial Service for the dead, the successful relocation of other persons, the impending collapse of Germany, the trend of the Pacific war, the fall of the Tojo cabinet, group discussions of the relocation problem, and the healing effects of time have made great inroads against this wishful thinking. The occupation of the Philippines will probably finish it, although it will not wholly eradicate it.

In summary: the opening of the West Coast, success for Allied arms in Europe and the Pacific, and continued and effective demonstrations of good faith on the part of WRA and the government will break the psychological block. Scars on the mental and emotional tissue of individual evacuees will remain, but the mass resistance to resettlement will dissolve, so far as attitudes are concerned.

B. Social and Economic blocks to resettlement are real.

1. Virtually all evacuees in the Center express the opinion that financial assistance is necessary for the bulk of the population. This investigation did not succeed in eliciting information in explicit terms as to the amount of the actual needs in terms of dollars and cents. Obviously, not all the evacuees who cry for assistance need it, but it would seem that a large proportion of families, perhaps a majority, do.

Roughly, we may say there are three groups:

- a. Those who still hold sufficient savings, property, or investments to make their way without loan or subsidy. Some of these are faced with problems of frozen funds or losses on their property for the duration.
- b. Those who have retained a few hundred or a few thousand dollars. They may have enough to make the plunge but because of their advanced age, they are exceedingly cautious about doing so. They hope desperately for government "guarantees" against the wiping out of their last savings through business or farming failures. They do not have any specific ideas as to how the government might do this. Yet they feel that the government, which was powerful enough to uproot them and perform economic miracles of war production, is able to rehabilitate them economically--if it will.

- c. Those who were completely ruined or who have exhausted the remnants of their savings through supplementing the subsistence maintenance allowed by WRA in the Center.

The second group seems to be the largest.

A host of special problems face the business man or farmer who wants to set out. It is often said from WRA's side that the business man should hire out for a while in the city of his choice to get the lay of the land and to find his opportunity. Up against this comes the antipathy of the successful Issei business man to hire out in a position of low status. Some will, but most cannot bring themselves to it. Problems of war priorities, establishment of credit in strange communities, of making new business contacts all seem unsurmountable in the remote isolation of the Center.

Farmers are up against the same thing to a lesser degree. They are more able and willing to hire out in order to test the possibilities of new areas. They have more opportunities for favorable land leases with little capital. But many have insufficient capital and no available agricultural equipment.

Professional people are handicapped by lack of reciprocal licensing between California and potential states for resettlement.

The old age of the Issei men is an unalterable fact. Time cannot be turned back for them. It is not idle talk for them to complain that they do not have the pioneering spirit or physical strength, which sustained them through their travails thirty and forty years ago. The farmers with families to support complain that without the aid of their sons they cannot manage a farm alone. Some say they must await the return of their boys from the army before they can launch out again on a family farm.

Of the 640 males over 60 years of age (as of March 31, 1944) 301 were single. (Table IV)

Resettlement of the aged bachelors and widowers before the resettlement of other evacuees in the West Coast area is hardly possible. Most of these men were casual farm laborers. In their pattern of living, before the war, they lived in "boarding houses" during the off-seasons and worked from the Imperial Valley northward during the growing period, to return to the "boarding house" when the season was ended. They rarely had more than a hundred or two dollars cash reserve. But that mattered little, since they would be carried on credit by the "boarding house" keeper, or by the doctors, if they needed medical aid. This whole system is broken up now and there is nothing for these familyless men to return to. They do not find life in the Center too unsatisfactory. They are housed well, according to their standards, are fed decently, have the company of their cronies and enjoy a social status which is higher than their pre-war condition. They will linger on.


V. Recommendations

1. From this point forward increasing attention should be paid to the furtherance of family and group resettlement.
 - a. The old and young people, who form the bulk of the residential population, can move only as members of a family unit.
 - b. The Issei will not resettle to any great extent unless they can locate in a community which contains a sufficient number of Japanese-Americans to provide them with social companionship and mutual aid. Such communities as have developed in new areas, to date, are segments of urban units, except in "saturated" rural areas in Colorado and nearby. The largest occupational group in the Center is that of the farmers. This group holds back until it can move out in family groups. The present trend in WRA relocation policy to assist and further rural group resettlement can well be extended and further implemented to good effect.
2. The log jam cannot possibly be broken until the West Coast is officially opened to all evacuees. But as has been previously stated, this will not in itself be enough to solve the problem. It will remove an important psychological block, which is rooted in negative reaction to discrimination.
 - a. A valuable good-will gesture that would go a long way towards removal of evacuee hostility and negativism toward the WRA administration (and consequently, resettlement) would be the removal of the unoccupied guard towers. The same may be said of the barbed wire fence. Neither of these serve to keep anyone either in or out of the Center. What they do accomplish is to stand as constant symbols to the residents of their "imprisonment." They are symbols of the evacuation--the past policy of the government. If WRA policy is now directed toward the resettlement and the future welfare of the evacuees, objective evidence of a strong kind is needed to prove it to the residents. No single step could be so effective as the removal of these hated monuments.
3. A special and carefully managed program of financial and social security assistance is called for within the WRA organization.
 - a. It may be that the Farm Security Administration, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Social Security Administration, etc., should properly provide whatever special needs the evacuees may have.

- b. However, there is no contact whatever between these agencies and the evacuees. Not a single evacuee interviewed was aware of the functions of these agencies nor had any idea of how to contact them.
 - c. What is needed is a revolving fund from which low interest loans can be obtained for resettlement. Administration by WRA officials, who will be close to the evacuees' problems and interested in them, will be required to make any such aid effective.
 - d. Assistance in the formation of farm cooperatives would be constructive.
4. The services now offered by the Relocation Field Offices do not seem to be adequate to the full needs of the resettlers. Even when making allowances for unreasonable demands upon the Field Offices, apparently legitimate dissatisfaction with the Field Offices' services is extensive.
 5. The policy of letting evacuee groups select reliable men of their own choice to go on investigatory trips with the assistance of WRA is just taking hold in this Center. It promises truly fine results. Unless events belie the potentialities, this program deserves full support and extension.
 6. If it is the intention of WRA to set up Relocation Field Offices in the West Coast area when that territory is opened, it will be well to announce this fact to the evacuees at the earliest possible moment, as a further assurance to the evacuees that WRA has their future welfare at heart. Such offices will be an absolute necessity, since the return to the Coast constitutes a resettlement problem for any evacuees who return there.
 7. It is the opinion of the analyst that welfare counselling as a branch of the larger Relocation Field Offices is fully as necessary as welfare counselling in the Center, possibly more so. WRA social service aid to resettlers should be accepted as a must.
 8. The Good Offices of WRA in seeking the cooperation of the states in making adjustments in the licensing of physicians and other professionals might produce results for this highly specialized group.
 9. The more the administration pressures the residents to resettle, the more they balk. If care is taken to aid them in resettlement and not to push them into it, better results will be obtained in the long run.

10. Finally, "relocation" as a word stands for the evacuation in the minds of people. It rolls into one all their emotions of shock, pain, disillusionment and grievance. It has nothing but negative emotional connotations. Word magic is powerful. If the Relocation Division and its offices were to be renamed "Resettlement" Division it would have more favorable and positive connotations among the people it must deal with--and to good effect.

FIGURE 1
 DISTRIBUTION OF CITIZEN AND ALIEN POPULATION
 by sex and 5 yr. age groups June 30, 1944



Prepared by Community Analysis Section
 Granada Relocation Center
 July, 1944

TABLE I
 DISTRIBUTION OF CITIZEN AND ALIEN POPULATION
 by sex and 5 yr. age groups
 June 30, 1944

AGE	NO. OF MALES	NO. OF FEMALES	% OF MALES	% OF FEMALES	TOTAL OF BOTH SEXES	% OF BOTH SEXES
0-4	367	320	12.6%	10.	687	11.3%
5-9	285	263	9.8%	8.3%	548	9.
10-14	334	327	11.5%	10.3%	661	10.8
15-19	253	356	8.7%	11.2%	609	10.
20-24	161	291	5.5%	9.1%	452	7.4%
25-29	70	236	2.4%	9.	356	5.8%
30-34	102	151	3.5%	4.7%	253	4.2%
35-39	98	109	3.4%	3.4%	207	3.4%
40-44	128	233	4.4%	7.3%	361	5.9%
45-49	92	281	3.2%	8.8%	373	6.1%
50-54	114	250	3.9%	7.8%	364	6.
55-59	294	129	10.1%	4.1%	423	6.9%
60-64	291	104	10.	3.3%	395	6.5%
65-69	187	63	6.4%	2.	250	4.1%
70-74	94	20	3.2%	.6%	114	1.9%
75 and over	37	4	1.3%	.1%	41	.7%
TOTAL	2909*	3188**	100.0%	100.0%	6097	100.0%

* two unaccounted for
 ** one unaccounted for

Prepared by Community Analysis Section
 Granada Relocation Center
 August, 1944

TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION OF CITIZEN POPULATION
by sex and 5 yr. age groups
June 30, 1944

AGE	NO. OF MALES	NO. OF FEMALES	% OF MALES	% OF FEMALES	TOTAL OF BOTH SEXES	% OF BOTH SEXES
0-4	367	320	22.7%	15.7%	687	18.8%
5-9	285	263	17.7%	12.9%	548	15.
10-14	333	326	20.6%	16.1%	659	18.1%
15-19	252	354	15.6%	17.4%	606	16.6%
20-24	159	289	9.8%	14.2%	448	12.3%
25-29	65	278	4.	13.7%	343	9.4%
30-34	82	123	5.1%	6.1%	205	5.6%
35-39	42	49	2.6%	2.4%	91	2.5%
40-44	22	14	1.4%	.7%	36	1.
45-49	1	8	.1%	.4%	9	.2%
50-54	2	7	.1%	.3%	9	.2%
55-59	2	0	.1%	0	2	.1%
60-64	3	3	.2%	.1%	6	.2%
TOTAL	1615	2034	100.%	100.%	3649	100.%

Prepared by Community Analysis Section
Granada Relocation Center
August, 1944

TABLE III

DISTRIBUTION OF ALIEN POPULATION
by sex and 5 yr. age groups
June 30, 1944

AGE	NO. OF MALES	NO. OF FEMALES	% OF MALES	% OF FEMALES	TOTAL OF BOTH SEXES	% OF BOTH SEXES
0-4	0	0	0	0	0	0
5-9	0	0	0	0	0	0
10-14	1	1	.1%	.1%	2	.1%
15-19	1	2	.1%	.2%	3	.1%
20-24	2	2	.2%	.2%	4	.2%
25-29	5	8	.4%	.7%	13	.5%
30-34	20	28	1.5%	2.4%	48	1.9%
35-39	56	60	4.3%	5.2%	116	4.7%
40-44	106	219	8.2%	16.9%	325	13.3%
45-49	91	273	7.	29.7%	364	14.9%
50-54	112	243	8.7%	21.	355	14.5%
55-59	292	129	22.6%	11.2%	421	17.2%
60-64	287	101	22.2%	6.7%	388	15.9%
65-69	187	63	14.5%	5.5%	250	10.2%
70-74	94	20	7.3%	1.7%	114	4.7%
75 and over	37	4	2.9%	.4%	41	1.7%
TOTAL	1294*	1154**	100.0%	100.0%	2448	100.0%

* two unaccounted for

** unaccounted for

Prepared by Community Analysis Section
Granada Relocation Center
August, 1944

Appendix I
To the Councilmen and Block Managers

- A. The Community Council and Block Managers Assembly have both endorsed a program of discussion on resettlement needs of the evacuees. This question is to be talked over between the evacuees and Dr. Hoebel, the Community Analyst. The purpose is to give the evacuees chance to express their opinions, in order to let WRA know just what the evacuees are up against.
1. Everyone is concerned with resettlement, now or later.
 2. The ones for whom resettlement was easy have gone out.
 3. The problem of resettlement is more difficult for those who remain.
 4. WRA needs to know just what the nature of our problem is, so it can plan more wisely in accordance with our needs.
 5. These discussions are for the purpose of telling WRA what the facts are.
 6. All opinions and statements will be confidential and will not be permitted to fly back in the face of anyone. Everybody should feel free to tell Dr. Hoebel what they think. He wants to understand the whole situation. These discussions with Dr. Hoebel will be for the good the people.

He does not want to lecture to you. He wants you to talk over resettlement with him as you see it.

- B. 1. The joint committee of the Council and Block Managers has agreed that this is the time for each block to have a block meeting just among its members to thrash out opinions on resettlement.

After this, each section will hold an evening meeting with Dr. Hoebel to talk it over.

2. The schedule of Section meetings and meeting places is as follows:

August 9,	Wednesday	Section	I	7F
"	10,	Thursday	II	7H
"	14,	Monday	III	9K
"	15,	Tuesday	IV	11F
"	16,	Wednesday	V	11H

3. The committee asks the councilman and block manager of each block to call a block meeting to discuss resettlement problems BEFORE the date set for his section discussion with Dr. Hoebel. Get your people together! Urge them to turn out for the section meetings.

This is the people's opportunity to talk things out. Let us all help. Tell your people what it is about.

The Joint Committee of
the Community Council
and Block Managers.

Appendix A.

Stenographic Record of Views Expressed by
Evacuees in the District Discussion Meetings
Held With the Community Analyst, August 10-18,
1944.

August 9, 1944

Evacuee A:

Since relocating to this center, three of my sons were called by the government into armed forces, except one has already been in the service immediately after the Pearl Harbor incident.

It would be very difficult for Issei's to solve this problem regarding the resettlement, because of our ages; moreover, we have spent all our workable years in California for more than 30 years. I haven't adequate principal to re-establish the business and I presume the others too, who might be interested in farming. I'm sure that they aren't able to purchase the equipment and other implements.

Evacuee B:

I understood that we are to stay here for the duration, but the rumors of returning to the normal life in California seem rather unjust because of our financial difficulty. Hence, I'm proposing the government to return us the standardized living materials and at the same time, I'm asking the government to finance us to re-start our normal life as we had it before the war. I should think it the responsibility of the government to return our financial comfort.

There are other racial minorities still enjoying their freedom, but the Japanese-Americans are on the contrary kept behind barbed wire fences, but have been called by the government to serve in the armed forces. However, the parents of boys in the armed forces are also facing the painful hardships, and almost forgotten by the public or the government, nevertheless, we, the parents of boys in the armed forces are doing our utmost so that our sons can serve the country better than other racial minorities.

Evacuee C:

I have no other desire than to return to my hometown in California. However, I'm old and worn out--resulting from my long years of labor and the spiritual destruction I received from the sudden evacuation.

Evacuee D:

Since the WRA is asking us to relocate to a strange part of the country, we must have sufficient knowledge regarding the climatical conditions, atmosphere, economical condition--especially, peoples' attitude toward Japanese in that particular region.

I'm asking government to secure us, resettlers, a reasonable business transaction with the local financial corporations or organizations. If this opportunity is granted many of the Issei are willing to answer the governmental order.

Evacuee E:

What is the fundamental principle of the WRA's resettlement program toward Issei when we have no financial background and asking us to relocate?

When the evacuees resettle in California, what is the governmental aid; or is there any such assistance to us?

When any evacuee re-establishes a business enterprise, and unfortunately, if he fails is there in government any way or plan to help the evacuees? Furthermore, if government takes interest in assisting in purchasing the agricultural implements I presume there'll be some groups who may relocate soon.

Evacuee F:

I should think it will cost about \$5000 for a family to start the normal life in California. If the government provides the above finance there will be more resettlers who will answer the problem.

Evacuee G:

The process taken by government to relocate the families of the service men to send them to their original state is unfair to the rest of the Issei families, because we have pledged this country to be loyal, and we don't see any difference. (The majority of the group, however, expressed the opinion that resettlement to California by families of soldiers might be wise as a first step).

The question of Issei's of refusal to relocate is greatly based on their financial situation. We cannot re-establish the new life without adequate assistance from the government.

It was stated by the Director of WRA in Washington, Mr. Myer saying that the problem of relocation is the evacuees' problem, but it was the responsibility of the government who made us relocate. The above statement certainly hurt the feeling of the people.

DISTRICT II

August 10, 1944

Evacuee H: (Representative from 6H Block)

The life within the barbed wire fence for two years was painful, and utterly destructive in our thoughts.

It would be very hard for any evacuee to live on the \$25.00 which offered by the WRA upon our relocation.

We have been thinking of resettling before long, but we are asking the government to return both our movable and unmovable properties we owned before the war; also we request that the government give us the reasonable protection to resettlers in all the states, and sufficient financial aid toward our resettlement.

We, farmers are especially great in need of the financial aid from the government.

After our resettlement what is the government's plan regarding our medical aid or does the government consider an evacuee doctor to operate within our circle?

Evacuee I:

What is the governmental explanation of the present situation toward Issei whose sons have been drafted and volunteered and who are still kept within wired fences?

Evacuee J:

The average Issei cannot endure the manual labor any longer without the assistance of their sons, and I presume from the standpoint of the Issei that the majority of the older generation refused to relocate for the above reason. However, if there is a concrete and definite plan to protect the evacuees, the government may find some resettlers. They would not be relocated otherwise.

Evacuee K:

Regarding the resettlement program presented by the WRA, we would like to see if it is permissible to move to our hometown in California with reasonable living provided by the government, or we can relocate in other states, that is, if provided the same conditions.

After our resettlement we would like to be protected by the judicial power, or similar organizations within our locality.

When the program is offered by the WRA such as we are discussing tonight, is it possible to secure more thorough information regarding the government's plan other than just asking us to relocate?

Evacuee L:

I lived outside for nearly a year and discovered that it was very apprehensive because of my inferiority complex. No matter where you go or rest, my mind was always in the state of conspicuousness and felt continuous anxiety toward the public.

But if the government permits a group relocation, we would not be in a position of being psychological disturbed. Hence, I would like to suggest a mass relocation.

Evacuee M:

Among our evacuees there are still a very few people who can depend on their savings, but a great majority of the group is rather on the verge of poverty, and it is impossible for them to re-establish their business or new life. This is the very point that evacuees are worried about.

Regarding the evacuees' business when they relocate I would like to suggest that government will provide a certain negotiation with the local business organizations or banks which is closely related with the government to give a certain degree of aid to evacuees which may probably interest the relocation.

I'm very much in favor of mass resettlement rather than two or three families. A group of 100 families and they can supply their needs within the group. The advantage of mass resettlement is to organize self-supply material, if we are to be aided by the government. There will be no problem concerning age of the evacuees. The group will plan the way of furnishing the food and other necessities.

In resettling in other snowy states, Japanese people cannot endure the climate, because of the high expense during the winter season.

No matter where we settle we must have the aid of finance from the government.

WRA is suddenly asking us to relocate, but do you ever consider the family situation in the center? The young people have almost all left for the outside and what remains is Issei women and children. Issei are not in the position to take these women and children and it is impossible to re-establish a living for Issei are, average 60-62 and have no courage to work on unfamiliar land after they have spent 30 to 40 years of manual labor. I wondered if WRA ever put the consideration on this point. In California we did our business whether its large or small and sent our children to school; moreover we had interest in sending them on to college and from the percentage of minority races Japanese is the highest.

In California we had many opportunities even then when business was inactive we did manage somehow, but we cannot do the same way in other places as we achieved in California, because of a lesser number of Japanese, but limited society.

When we think of a business position in other states do you suppose we, as Japanese-Issei can secure the license like we did in California? This might affect all the professionals as a whole. I don't think any doctor could become

a common laborer or manual laborer because of his impossibility to secure a license.

I have heard several times that WRA officials expressed opinions to us to become manual laborers if and when we cannot secure a suitable position, but it's too cruel to judge us all as common laborers.

There are numbers of positions offered to Issei, but all of these are nothing but laborers in cities only, but I much prefer to work in rural districts as a farmer, but the financial difficulty is the main restlessness toward our resettlement.

Evacuee N:

What if all the farmers relocate from here, who would take care of the farm land in the center?

Evacuee O:

I've lived in California for nearly 40 years and enjoyed life tremendously, but since relocating here in Colorado, my land lease expired several months ago. At this point I wanted to change of landownership to my daughter, and with this purpose I went to my hometown but we were refused to unload the luggage where we used to know everybody in town--especially my children were born there and raised among the caucasian friends. This kind of attitude really discouraged me to resettle in some unknown country.

Many of us thought of resettling sooner or later, but there is always difficulty--that is--to transact business with Caucasian people. It is impossible to make a living in this condition because of racial hatred and suspicion among the local people. Hence, I would like to suggest resettlement with a great mass of our people and re-establish business while others can work among themselves.

DISTRICT III

August 13, 1944

Evacuee I:

There is a strong connection of the family system between Issei and Nisei, that we cannot overlook and wondered if WRA officials understand the situation. Even if Nisei relocate they always answer the call of family emergency without considering the circumstance or distance. The problem of Issei's resettlement is seriously taken by the Nisei. It is quite different from the Caucasian customs practiced among Nisei regarding their consideration on the problem of family affairs. As a Japanese custom to look each other's family without thinking of

the ages of both families--Issei always watch the incidents of their children even after the separation by marriage and it is the custom of Nisei to look after parents when they become older.

Through the channel of this family tie we cannot separate from the family unit. However, in a large scale it is effective toward the communities of the Japanese societies, and the family system is always being carried directly or indirectly--especially the present program of resettlement is largely and widely concerned by us all the Japanese race.

I would like to suggest the government that it is necessary to study the above situation regarding the Japanese problems.

Evacuee Q:

In cooperating with the governmental order we must first write our families in order to resettle, secondly, we must have or be aided by government in economical comfort; thirdly, we must be protected by some agencies of government in order to have a safe and comfortable living like the pre-war condition.

Evacuee R:

There are many Nisei who have already relocated, but did WRA ever think of why resettlers families who are still residing in the center, and majority of the Nisei are in cities only. Many of these Nisei complained when they visited their families saying that the life in cities are tough and impossible to find an adequate house to live with the family. It is much safer to let the family live in the center because of their own race and community.

There are many positions in cities even for Issei, but in the agricultural regions, there are many of us who are thinking of resettling as farmers, but the government seemed very unsuccessful toward resettling Issei in farm lands. Majority of the Japanese have a special characteristic in cultivation and raising agricultural products. But we are not fitted in manual labor as we are too old to work in cities. The Japanese people have a very strong love of soil and nature, and I presume the best solution is to acquire an agricultural land and have them resettle.

The difficulty of Issei in city life is greatly concerned of lack of English knowledge, and they cannot have a comfortable life among Caucasians who only speak English. The lack of English is the main and sole problem among Issei.

Evacuee S:

As you can see us now that most of us (Issei) are old and cannot work as a hard laborer, and many of our sons have been drafted to whom we were dependent on for the rest of our lives, but its impossible. However, we rather prefer to stay in this center until the Armistice.

Evacuee T:

I lived in California for more than 20 years and 15 years in Washington as farmer. I have operated a small business firm in California but was comfortable and happy. I've sent my two sons to school and raised them to be perfect Americans. I had a little saving before the war, but unfortunately the incident tore up all our property which were movable and unmovable. We sold all our business property for less than one-third of the cost price. Since relocating here and Santa Anita we have spent more than half of our savings and confronted with the poverty, this situation reminds me of my early years in this country.

The question the resettlement is truly welcome in spirit but physically we cannot face it without a certain principal so that we may again live like a human being just as before the war in California. We cannot possibly encourage ourselves like a pioneer (spirit) like we did 30 years ago. Spiritually we are defeated and physically it is too late to start a new life.

Evacuee U:

Last few months I lived in Nebraska being a laborer, but I couldn't endure the work any longer because I was raised as a merchant and have no idea how to manage the manual labor procedure in order to bring myself together.

I was, out as a seasonal laborer, but discovered that my qualification has been changed as an indefinite leave, which angered my feeling toward local WRA officials. It was certainly not known to me and certainly I didn't apply for the indefinite leave. Since then I have no confidence toward any problems from the WRA.

The life on the outside was very painful because of my restlessness and always thinking of next move to protect myself. But if we relocate with a mass it wouldn't be so strenuous.

Through my experience I advise the people not to relocate where it is unknown or lack of information regarding the region. If we relocate in a large group we can all depend and at the same time can encourage ourselves, to help each other instead of depending on the public organizations or charity societies of the outside. As a rule we are not accustomed to receive any charitable assistance organized by the local public.

Evacuee V:

Since the war, all of us lost our family foundations, both in economic and spiritual relations and we are now just as we were when we first landed in America. We wondered many times why other enemy aliens are not being evacuated like we are now. If the government based its action on the separation of racial discrimination, we certainly admit that we are quite different from the other enemy aliens. However, we have been once or twice investigated by the so-called "FBI" and those who appeared to be dangerous are already interned, or because

they are the prisoners of war, and segregated from the centers. Whoever remain here are all pledged to be loyal to this country; moreover, we happily sent off our sons to the fronts so that our spiritual attitudes toward the government are all alike compared with the other minorities, who are enjoying life on the outside.

Since two long years in this center and Santa Anita, majority of Issei are thinking of relocation as farmers and businessmen to enjoy life like the others. However, we cannot be relocated without a sufficient fund of economical aid.

Evacuee W:

Recently a friend of mine lived in a certain part of this State of Colorado and returned for a visit. He took some evacuees to fill his urgent need of shipping the agricultural products. However, he came to the point of shipping the products and few days before the final outcome he was told that the state passed a law forbidding export of any agricultural products to any other state. This resulted in great damage to him as well as disappointment impressed upon the evacuees who were working under him. The condition I have just mentioned has been well rooted in this center and we received the impression that there will be no opportunity for the Japanese race in the field of shipping, which most of us were familiar with from the experience in California.

Before the WRA presents the program of relocation why don't the officials study this point I've mentioned above--especially the local WRA? This is of vital importance to many of us, who were thinking of opening the new field in other states with our own capital, but the occurrence discouraged us and we decided to extend our living in the center. The final conclusion is that no matter where we may relocate or establish the business we cannot be given the same rights and equalities which other races enjoy.

Evacuee X:

As long as racial discrimination is well spread--especially toward Japanese race, there would be no relaxation or safety to be had on the outside. If the government permits the mass resettlement of the Japanese there would be no troubles among ourselves.

Since we have spent most of our workable years in California, and we have no desire to relocate and work among Caucasians with the uncomfortable feeling, I would like to demand the government to purchase farming land where a mass of Japanese can relocate and run the farm land among ourselves.

Evacuee Y:

During all this meeting we have touched only Issei's standpoint, but I would like to ask the government to give more attention toward the problem of the Nisei, who are giving their supreme sacrifice to their country of America in order to protect it from the disturbances outside of this sphere.

I hope this government will give these Nisei equality and rights and privileges they have been given in the Constitution. I want them to be happy just as any other citizen should enjoy.

DISTRICT IV

August 15, 1944

Evacuee Z:

At this meeting a representative from 8K read the minutes of his block meeting (See Appendix A-1)

Evacuee AA:

A representative from 9L also made an announcement that his block minutes coincides with the purpose, opinion and request presented by 8K. However, he didn't suggest further.

Evacuee BB:

Again, 9K representative presented his block minutes. (See Appendix A-2)

Evacuee CC:

Each evacuee receives \$25.00 upon his departure from the center to his relocation point, which is rather insufficient. However, the WRA should provide at least the expense of two months or more and an additional \$25.00.

Evacuee DD:

Have the WRA officials ever thought of the average age of the Issei in this Center? Many of us cannot take out our family even if he relocates, because of his age and the condition of the family finances. Most of Issei are old and can hardly stand strenuous labor, but those who can stand the manual labor are children, nevertheless they are too young to take care of themselves--that is without parents.

Evacuee EE:

First of all I would like to make a request to the government to aid us with guaranteed protection and living assurances. The racial problem has widely jeopardized this movement, but a clear explanation by the government may impress the people and make a better understanding. Again, I would specially like to emphasize equality to Issei.

Special protection should be given to our property when we relocate, and finally we all request financial aid before our relocation.

Evacuee EF:

It is impossible for Issei to relocate, because the Issei have to accompany the family of elderly women and children. If the government guaranteed the living assurance we will relocate immediately.

Evacuee GG:

We cannot relocate individually for the duration, because of fear of mass attack or discrimination. But we could be relocated with a group of people. The result of the group living of Japanese is well explained in the history of the Japanese communities along the Pacific Coast, especially it is widely propagandized in Los Angeles. Fortunately we did not produce any public dependents, but if we did it was the lowest percentage compared with other racial minorities.

Evacuee HH:

The family system of Japanese has been deeply rooted for centuries among ourselves. If the WRA takes the action of relocating in group resettlement we wouldn't have any public burden to the Caucasian society, but will be beneficial to them. I'm firmly in favor of group resettlement of the evacuees.

Evacuee II:

In case California is opened for the evacuees, it would be a successful plan to resettle with a group of 15 or 25 families, and gradually increase the number of families. Because it might raise a strong friction if we migrate all at once. Gradual development is a most successful plan to be carried.

Evacuee JJ:

I would like to suggest the WRA to have an informal meeting among the different fields of professionals, and this meeting will be more effective and fruitful. After the above meetings conclude, then we would again meet together.

1. Doctors (pharmacists and nurses)
2. Merchants
3. Farmers

Evacuee KK:

Since arriving in America, I soon became a Christian and worked among the people of my own race. I married and raised children to be true Americans. We all determined to live and adopt this country as our own; we all tried hard to assimilate into the customs of this new country of ours; my wife and I struggled greatly to follow the American way of living. All these 30 years of living in America and our hopes and ambitions were suddenly destroyed on the day of our evacuation. All I want to ask the government is to return my only home and my grave yard lot which we purchased to be buried on this American soil.

Evacuee LL: (The only Nisei speaker)

Since I was born, I have been raised strictly in American ways of living, but I do not know the other families who have sons or daughters of my age. Regarding the Issei's relocation problem I feel sorry that they have to face this critical situation just as much as we, the Nisei are suffering spiritually, because our rights of citizenship have been trampled down, and we are being treated like any other foreign born people. I think the parents of Nisei over 18 years of age ought to let them solve the problem among themselves, because they are matured and know how to plan for the future in American ways of thinking. Hence, I'm very much against any control of our future problem by one parents.

DISTRICT V

August 16, 1944

Evacuee MM:

My personal opinions are completely included in Mr. Yoshida's outline regarding the program. (See Appendix A-3) Nevertheless, I firmly request governmental aid toward our economic security.

Evacuee NN:

Our pre-war condition in California was hopeful and ambitious, but since relocating to Santa Anita and Granada our plan of the future becomes unknown and undecided. We doubt deeply whether we still have energy and spirit to start our re-building the home again or not. Since our sons have joined the armed forces we have felt rather pessimistic about our future plans.

Evacuee OO:

We all appreciate the efforts extended to us by Dr. Koebel, and looking and waiting forward for the effective results out of these informal meetings in different districts.

I am sure that out of these free opinions we shall benefit in the future. However, the outline (Appendix A-3) consists of eight columns including almost all of our important ideology. I request the WRA to consider the program based on the eight columns given by Mr. Yoshida.

Evacuee PP:

When we came to this country we were not ordinary travelers, but to find our homes most of us adapted this country as our own. Of course, we are all different from other Caucasian minorities, and handicapped by the lack of knowledge in English..

Personally I would like to ask WRA to glance over the condition and nature of the remaining population. However, at present we have only children and women and aged people who are, moreover depending on each other. What will be the first problem confronting them when these weaker people relocate? Can the officials aid more sufficiently economically and the living?

Evacuee 44:

The eight columns just presented by the interpreter covered almost every field, but it is based on those who intend or plan to relocate. What is the attitude of those who remain in the center?

To this question I would rather prefer to stay until California is open for evacuees.

Evacuee RR:

I deeply regret the personal or official opinion expressed by Mr. Lindley during the councilmen's meeting regarding the treatment of evacuees during the war. If any official who takes such an attitude as Mr. Lindley, the Project Director of Granada, impressed a pessimistic future to come. I would like to hear Dr. Hoebel's personal opinion regarding the statements by Mr. Lindley.

Evacuee SS:

Since our arrival two years ago, it was a painful and disgusting life and treatment we experienced, and if the war prolongs our treatment should be changed. However, we are not treated as a human being, and I firmly request the government to change the policy to treat us more comfortably materially or physically.

Evacuee TT:

I am very happy to learn the news of California regarding the possibility of realization of our relocation along the Pacific Coast. I'm hoping to return to California before we all become dreadful.

Evacuee UU:

When the resettlement program becomes actuality I would like to suggest and request this government the following points:

- A. Permit all Nisei regardless of their nature to return to the West Coast.
- B. The government should take responsibility for the establishment of the evacuee homes.
- C. Guaranteeing the living tranquility.
- D. Upon our resettlement the government should be more generous toward our process of re-establishment of business.

If it is possible we prefer to move in a large group.

Evacuee VV:

I am a father of two soldiers who are now fighting in European soil. After the war, I request the government to treat the boys like any Caucasians.

The question was brought up as to why the Nisei soldiers are separated from Caucasian battalions.

Appendix A-1

Statement of Block Sentiment on Resettlement Road
by on behalf of Block 8K at Meeting of
District IV, August 15, 1944

Percentage indicate proportion of those present at the block meeting, who are reported to have subscribed to each statement.

1. 18%

Wherever we evacuate we need the security and guarantee of our life and property. Otherwise it is the most difficult thing to undertake when it comes to actual fact.

2. 80%

Duration of war we prefer to remain in the Center because there are many actual instances that our life will be at stake.

3. 2%

We Issei's stay in this country average 40 years. During these years we used our effort to assimilate ourselves in American way of life, but unfortunately, the law passed by Congress that we became ineligible to citizenship. Therefore, that part became hopeless. Yet, fortunately, our children were recognized as the native born citizen by the Constitution. They are educated entirely in American way by their education in public schools and colleges. They are entirely American; the only difference is their skin and color. We all believe that if we were Caucasians we would never have been treated as we are now. It is because we are racially different. Standing before the Almighty, Government knows that when General DeWitt said, "Jap is a Jap, always a Jap." That statement represented the real fact in the case because the Government never refuted that statement.

The record of Nisei shows hundred per cent American as to their loyalty even compared with other nationalities. Amidst education they are ready to take up arms for the defense of their country even when they are under guard surrounded by barbed wires like prisoners. When they are classed as 4C they did not grumble, and when they were changed to 1-A and called to colors they did not grumble but obeyed though there were few who stood up on constitutional ground. Good many have volunteered. Even we give our best the general public do not understand but look us with suspicion. What could we do? We ask only human treatment, freedom, and fair play guaranteed by the Constitution.

Appendix A-2

RESULTS OF ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON RELOCATION PROBLEM
9K BLOCK
Presented at meeting of District IV, August 15, 1944

1. Ni. WRA should allow a loan of \$5000.00 at minimum interest to each family at resettlement for 20 years.
2. Mo. I shall not relocate to any place but California, and shall demand the payment of evacuation damage.
3. Ta. WRA should make a loan of actually necessary amount of money to each of us at resettlement.
4. O. I shall not relocate until such time that resettlement is possible to any state in the union.
5. Ma. WRA should make loans to groups of families attempting a new enterprise in farming or other business.
6. U. WRA should promote group resettlement with about 100 families as a unit, and lease 10 acres of land to each who is over 15 years of age, at free rentals for the first five years. In addition, allowance to cover the first year living expenses, some farm implements, and seeds should be given.

As to the place of relocation, California is preferred but there is no objection to going into other regions if the investigation shows promising.

7. Mo. I agree with (1) Ni. except in the amount of loan. I propose that WRA give us a loan of \$500.00 per person.
8. Tsu. I demand that the U. S. Government return us to our original place and pay us in full the damage we received in the evacuation.
9. Ko. I agree with Ni.
10. Ws. I shall not express my personal opinion because I consider the question should be discussed between the two governments.
11. Co. I will not relocate until the war is over.


Appendix A-3

Outline of the Opinions Regarding
Resettlement Problem in Granada

- I. The Economical Difficulty
 - A. Purchasing Agricultural Implements.
 - B. Re-establishment of Living.
- II. The Problem is difficult for aged Issei
 - A. Too old (average age of Issei is about 62-64) to work as a manual laborer
 - B. No intention of continuing strenuous work
- III. Governmental Protection is Needed for Resettlers
 - A. The Incidents of Portland (desecration of Buddhist cemetery)
 - B. Fear of Mob Action
- IV. The Professional People Need Renewal of Licenses
 - A. Californian License is not recognized in other States
 - B. Need of governmental advise to various States
 - C. Understanding of Government and State Rights
- V. More Definite Information is Necessary from other States
 - A. Climate
 - B. Economical Condition
 - C. Customs
 - D. Atmosphere toward Evacuees
- VI. Group Resettlement
 - A. It provides for mutual aid.
 - B. Shields us individually from outside prejudice
 - C. Solve our economical programs ourselves
- VII. Contract Loan with Government
 - A. Need to develop better understanding with local financial circles.
 - B. Request of assisting and financing the evacuees
- VIII. Group Resettlement in California


DISTRIBUTION OF ALIEN POPULATION
by sex and 5 yr. age groups June 30, 1944

FIGURE 2



DISTRIBUTION OF GIBNESE POPULATION
by sex and 5 yr. age groups June 30, 1944

FIGURE 3



Prepared by Community Analysis Section
Granada Delegation Center
July, 1944